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Abstract
This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze
the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy outcomes. Although such ef-
forts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing
participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy
outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organiza-
tions. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of
the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante
voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains
are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing
in the segment’s size.
JEL Classification: D72, C72, L30
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1 Introduction
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 not only establishes guidelines for governmen-
tal agencies, but also specifically encourages nongovernmental entities to take an active role
in voter registration. There is a myriad of nonprofit organizations — such as the Associa-
tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), Declare Yourself, the League
of Women Voters, and Rock the Vote to name a few — actively engaged in this effort.
However, the tax-exempt status of these nonprofit organizations requires that any get-out-
the-vote efforts (henceforth, gotv) be nonpartisan. A natural question that arises is: how do
nonpartisan gotv efforts influence policy outcomes?
Although there is extensive research on the effectiveness of the various gotv methods,1 the
theoretical research on how nonpartisan gotv efforts influence policy outcomes is scant.2 This
is especially true when contrasted to the voluminous research on related political influence
activities such as lobbying.3 One reason for this neglect may be the fact that nonparti-
san gotv efforts often claim lofty goals such as promoting democracy.4 However, the most
engaged nonprofit organizations are inherently political and are typically attached to a par-
ticular segment of the electorate. And, in contrast to encouraging broad participation in
government, nonpartisan groups may legally target their gotv efforts in a way that promotes
their political objectives.5
1See Green and Gerber (2008) for a survey of this research.
2An exception to this is in the sociology literature following Marwell (2004), which considers the role of
nonprofit organizations in machine politics.
3Closely related to our focus is the literature on group or collective rent seeking. See for example Cheik-
bossian (2008), Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), Nitzan (1991), and Nti (1998).
4This may also partly be due to the fact that in the two-party Hotelling-Downs model voter abstention
[as first discussed by Downs 1957 (who uses the term ‘rational’ non-voting) and by Converse 1966 (who
uses the term ‘dynamic’ non-voting)] does not alter the policy choices of office-seeking candidates. See for
example Hinich and Ordeshook (1969), Ledyard (1984), and Riker and Ordeshook (1973).
5According to IRS rules for 501(c)(3)s, nonpartisan gotv efforts may be targeted at groups that are either
under represented or that broadly share a set of common interests. For further details see the April 17, 2008
IRS memo which describes the Political Activities Compliance Initiative for the 2008 political campaign
season (available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2008 paci program letter.pdf).
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To examine how targeted nonpartisan gotv efforts influence policy outcomes we utilize
a three-period model of redistributive politics with segmented voters.6 The electorate con-
sists of a finite number of disjoint segments, which may differ in size. In each segment an
exogenously specified portion (possibly zero) of the citizens abstains from voting, and the
abstention rates (or conversely, voter turnout rates) may vary across segments. Each voter
prefers higher to lower transfers, and each segment has a nonprofit advocacy organization
that represents its interests. In period one, each nonprofit may increase the voter turnout
rate in its segment by investing in nonpartisan gotv efforts that target the citizens in its seg-
ment. In period two, the two expected vote-share maximizing political parties observe the
segments’ updated turnout rates, and announce budget-balanced redistributive schedules,
which consist of an intra-segment homogeneous transfer level for each segment.7 In period
three, each of the voters votes for the party that offers the higher transfer.
In equilibrium, only a subset of the nonprofit organizations engage in nonpartisan gotv
efforts with the gotv efforts occurring only in those segments of the electorate which are
sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante abstention rate). In the
segments in which nonpartisan gotv efforts arise, the change in the voter turnout rate, as
a result of the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv efforts, is increasing in the segment’s level of
disenfranchisement and is decreasing in the segment’s size. The increases in the voter turnout
rates in the smaller more disenfranchised segments lead the parties to place relatively greater
weight on those segments, which results in higher equilibrium expected transfers to those
6Our model builds on the redistributive politics literature with segmented voters. See for example Cox
and McCubbins (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996), Laslier (2002),
Strömberg (2004), Schultz (2007), Kovenock and Roberson (2008, 2009), and Roberson (2008) among others.
Also related is Myerson’s (1993) model of redistributive politics with non-segmented voters. Recent examples
of this approach include Crutzen and Sahuguet (2009) and Sahuguet and Persico (2006).
7This may, alternatively, be interpreted as a level of local public good provision under the following
assumptions: (1) each citizen has the same preferences for local public good provision, (2) these preferences
are linear with respect to the level of local public good provision, (3) there are constant returns to the
production of the local public goods, and (4) there are no externalities or spillovers from local public good
provision.
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segments. Conversely, the segments that are larger and more civically engaged (i.e., have
lower ex ante abstention rates) receive lower expected transfers.
The intuition for the equilibrium pattern of nonpartisan gotv efforts and the resulting
impact on policy outcomes follows from the interaction of size and disenfranchisement effects.
The nonprofit advocacy organizations optimally engage in nonpartisan gotv efforts in order
to maximize their respective segment’s equilibrium expected transfer — which is strictly
increasing in the segment’s turnout rate — net of the cost of their nonpartisan gotv efforts.
Since each segment’s equilibrium expected transfer depends on the segment’s turnout rate,
the nonprofit advocacy groups in the smaller segments have a size advantage. To increase a
segment’s turnout rate by any given percentage the number of initially non-voting citizens
who must become voting citizens and, hence, the cost of the nonpartisan gotv efforts needed
to induce this change, is increasing in the size of the segment. For example consider two
segments (A and B), each with a turnout rate of 50%, but in segment A there are 4 citizens (2
voters and 2 non-voters) while in segment B there are 8 citizens (4 voters and 4 non-voters).
In order to increase the turnout rate to 75%, segment A needs only one non-voting citizen to
become a voter, but segment B needs two additional voters. To summarize, the smaller the
segment the larger the marginal effect that each initially non-voting citizen who, through
nonpartisan gotv efforts, switches and becomes a voting citizen has on the turnout rate.
In addition to the size effect, in the more disenfranchised segments increasing the turnout
rate by any given percentage requires that a lower proportion of initially non-voting citizens
become voters as a result of the nonpartisan gotv efforts. If the marginal return to nonpar-
tisan gotv efforts is increasing with respect to the proportion of non-voting citizens, then
the nonprofit advocacy groups also encounter a voter disenfranchisement effect. Combining
the size and disenfranchisement effects, it follows that the nonprofit advocacy organizations
in the smaller more disenfranchised segments can more readily increase their turnout rates
and that, as a result, these segments benefit the most from the resulting changes in the
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equilibrium expected transfers.
Our results indicate that nonpartisan gotv efforts have a meaningful impact on the policy
choices of office-seeking parties, and — in addition to broadly encouraging civic engagement
— are an important political influence tool for nonprofit advocacy groups. The competition
between nonprofit organizations through nonpartisan gotv efforts is a heretofore unexplored
form of special interest politics in which the advocacy efforts are constrained by the regula-
tions on nonprofit organizations. In spite of these constraints, our results are reminiscent of
issues that arise in the literature on the combination of lobbying or campaign contributions
and electoral competition (see, for example, Austen-Smith 1987, Baron 1994, Besley and
Coate 2001, and Grossman and Helpman 1996, 2001). In this setting as in ours, special
interest groups simultaneously and non-cooperatively compete in order to influence the out-
come of the election and the resulting policies. However, in our setting this competition is
over voter turnout and the indirect effect that this has, through the relative weights that
the political parties place on the segments, on the election and the resulting policies. Our
analysis, thus, extends the literature on special interest politics to allow for nonprofit ad-
vocacy groups who use targeted nonpartisan gotv efforts and demonstrates the impact that
such efforts have on policy outcomes.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the multistage model of redistributive
politics with targeted nonpartisan gotv efforts. Section 3 characterizes the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies in the model and examines the nature of the equilibrium transfers
by the parties and the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv efforts by the nonprofit organizations.
Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
To examine how targeted nonpartisan gotv efforts influence policy outcomes we utilize a
three-period model of redistributive politics. In the first (or nonpartisan gotv) stage, each
nonprofit organization in each segment of the electorate simultaneously chooses a level of
investment in targeted nonpartisan gotv effort. Within each segment, the targeted nonpar-
tisan gotv efforts increase the turnout rate in that segment. In the second (or campaign)
stage, the two political parties observe the segments’ updated turnout rates, and each party
simultaneously announces a transfer schedule. In the final (or voting) stage, each voter in
each segment observes the proposed transfer from each party and votes for the party that
offers the higher transfer (with ties broken by fair randomization).
The initial conditions of the game are given as follows. The electorate consists of a finite
number nc of citizens. Each citizen belongs to one of the finite number ns of identifiable and
disjoint segments indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . , ns}. The number of citizens in segment j is denoted
mj, so that
∑ns
j=1mj = nc. The segments of citizens may be distinguished by characteristics,
such as race, gender, age, socioeconomic factors, geographic location, etc.
Citizens may either be voters or non-voters. Within each segment of citizens, a proportion
of the citizens abstains from voting in period three.8 While we abstract from the exact cause
of voter abstention, this may be thought of as arising from considerations such as costly
voting. Let v0j ∈ (0, 1) denote the initial proportion of the citizens in segment j who turn
out and vote in the election (henceforth, the turnout rate). Alternatively, 1−v0j is the initial
8In assuming a deterministic and finite number of voters in each segment we are ignoring integer problems
that arise when the turnout and abstention rates generate non-whole numbers of citizens who intend to vote
or abstain. This integer problem can be avoided without difficulty in a number of ways. First, one can
assume, when necessary, the existence of a marginal citizen in the segment that is endowed with a fractional
vote rather than a full vote Alternatively, one can assume that the actual number of citizens voting within a
segment is stochastic, but whole, but that the expected turnout and abstention rates generate mathematical
expectations that are potentially non-whole. Finally, we can assume the number of citizens in each segment
is large and that our continuous treatment is viewed as an arbitrarily close approximation. In fact, our
analysis would not be altered substantially if we assumed that each of the finite number of segments contains
a continuum of citizens.
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proportion of the citizens in segment j who abstain from voting (henceforth, the abstention
rate), and the initial number of non-voters in segment j is (1−v0j )mj. Observe that segment
j is distinguished by both its number of citizens mj and its initial turnout rate v
0
j . Moreover,
j’s share of the total voting population is mjv
0
j/
∑ns
h=1mhv
0
h.
Let the three-stage game with segment sizes m = (m1, . . . ,mns) and initial turnout rates
v0 = (v01, . . . , v
0
ns) be denoted Γ(m,v
0). We start the description of the model in the final
stage.
Voting Stage
Suppose that as a result of nonpartisan gotv efforts in the first stage the voter turnout
rate in each of the segments in the final voting stage is updated from v0 = (v01, . . . , v
0
ns) to
v = (v1, . . . , vns). Moreover, let ti,j denote the transfer promised to each citizen in segment
j by party i ∈ {A,B} in the second stage of the game. We assume that all citizens prefer
higher to lower transfers and in the final stage each citizen that is a voter votes for the party
that provides the higher transfer (with ties broken by fair randomization). Hence, if party i
provides a strictly higher transfer to segment j than its rival party, it earns the votes of the
mjvj voters in that segment, with mj(1− vj) citizens abstaining from voting.9
Campaign Stage
The second stage consists of a redistributive politics model which extends Laslier (2002)
and Laslier and Picard (2002) to allow for voter abstention. At the start of period two, the
two expected vote-share maximizing political parties, denoted by i ∈ {A,B}, observe the
segments’ updated turnout rates v = (v1, . . . , vns) and make binding promises as to how
they would allocate a fixed budget across the electorate. The fixed budget is normalized to
9For simplicity, our focus is on the case of deterministic voting, but, as discussed in Section 3, our results
are robust to probabilistic voting considerations. It is, therefore, not necessary to interpret our model as
requiring that every voter within a given segment votes for the same party.
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one unit of the homogeneous good. The parties may target campaign promises of different
transfers to different segments, but within each segment of citizens, each citizen receives the
same transfer. We assume that ti,j, the transfer promised to each citizen in segment j by
party i, must be nonnegative. For each party, the set of feasible ns-tuples of transfers across
the ns segments of the electorate is denoted by
T =
{
t ∈ Rns+
∣∣∣∣ ns∑
j=1
mjtj = 1
}
.
As in Laslier (2002), if a single segment of the electorate contains a majority of the voters,
then the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies, in which both of the parties offer the entire
budget to the segment with the majority of voters. If no single segment contains a majority
of voters, then there are no pure-strategy equilibria in the campaign stage. For each party
i ∈ {A,B} a mixed strategy, which we label a transfer schedule, is an ns-variate distribution
function Pi : Rns+ → [0, 1] with support, denoted Supp(Pi), contained in the set of feasible
transfers, T , and with the set of univariate marginal distribution functions {Fi,j}nsj=1, one
univariate marginal distribution function for each segment of the electorate. The ns-tuple of
party i’s transfer of resources across the ns segments is a random ns-tuple drawn from the
ns-variate distribution Pi. Recall that the elements of this random ns-tuple represent the
transfer promised to each citizen in segment j by party i, for j = 1, . . . , ns.
In order to rule out the possibility that the game is initially or becomes degenerate, we
assume that no single segment is too large in the sense that if all of the segment’s citizens
were to turn out and vote the segment would not contain a majority of the voters.
Assumption 1. For all j,
mj <
∑
j′ 6=j
mj′v
0
j′ .
A direct consequence of Assumption 1 is that neither before nor after the nonpartisan
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gotv efforts does a single segment contain a majority of the voters.
As is common in the literature on electoral competition, we assume that the implemented
policy is a probabilistic compromise of the parties’ offered transfers, which takes on party
A’s ns-tuple of transfers with probability equal to party A’s vote share and takes on party
B’s ns-tuple of transfers with probability equal to party B’s vote share.
10 Let E(tj) denote
the expected transfer received by each citizen in segment j from the implemented policy
generated by the two parties’ transfer schedules.
Nonpartisan gotv Stage
In each segment j ∈ {1, . . . , ns}, there is a nonprofit advocacy organization, denoted by
NPj, which represents the segment’s interests. In the first stage, each of the nonprofits
has the opportunity to make an investment in nonpartisan gotv efforts. The nonpartisan
gotv technology works as follows. The nonprofit organization in segment j chooses a target
rate xj ∈ [0, 1], which represents the proportion of initially non-voting citizens that, as
a result of the nonpartisan gotv efforts, become voters. For example, nonpartisan gotv
efforts may provide information about voter registration, the location of polling stations, or
other information which lowers the cost of voting, and, thereby, increase the turnout rate.
Alternatively, the nonpartisan gotv efforts may serve to increase the value of the process
benefits accruing from the expressive act of voting. In either case, if the nonprofit chooses
a target rate of xj for the nonpartisan gotv effort, then the proportion of voting citizens
increases by (1 − v0j )xj. That is, the turnout rate changes from its initial value v0j to the
updated value vj(xj) as follows
vj(xj) ≡ v0j + (1− v0j )xj. (1)
10See for example Grossman and Helpman (1996).
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After the nonpartisan gotv stage, segment j’s share of the voters ismjvj(xj)/
∑ns
h=1mhvh(xh),
which relative to segment j’s initial share of the voters may either increase or decrease
depending upon the actions of the nonprofit organizations in the other ns − 1 segments.
Each nonprofit advocacy organization’s objective function is assumed to be linearly sep-
arable in the costs and benefits of gotv effort. By choosing a target rate of xj ∈ [0, 1] for the
nonpartisan gotv effort, the nonprofit organization incurs a cost of xjc(mj, v
0
j ), where the
constant marginal cost c(mj, v
0
j ) satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The constant marginal cost of nonpartisan gotv effort is given by
c(mj, v
0
j ) = αmj(1− v0j )
where α is a constant that is greater than 1/(
∑ns
h=1mhv
0
h)).
A constant marginal cost of the form given in Assumption 2 corresponds to a constant
unit cost per new voter equal to α. That is, increasing the number of voters in segment
j by mj(1 − v0j )xj entails a total cost of xjc(mj, v0j ) = αmj(1 − v0j )xj, and the resulting
constant unit cost per voter is (αmj(1− v0j )xj)/(mj(1− v0j )xj) = α. While this is a stylistic
assumption, this choice of cost structure is motivated as follows. Given the high level of
information that is available to nonprofit organizations and the high degree of targetability in
the standard gotv methods (direct mail, phone banks, door-to-door, etc), nonprofit advocacy
organizations have the ability to identify the non-voting citizens and to directly target their
nonpartisan gotv efforts at the non-voters. It, therefore, seems reasonable to assume a
constant unit cost per new voter. However, our main results are qualitatively similar under
the assumption that gotv efforts must be broadly targeted at the entire segment rather than
at just the non-voters.11 Assumption 2’s condition on the constant unit cost per new voter
11It is straightforward to extend Theorem 2 to allow for alternative cost specifications. Under the assump-
tion that the constant marginal cost depends on only the number of citizens (an assumption consistent with
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α (α > 1/
∑ns
h=1mhv
0
h) rules out the possibility that any nonprofit would optimally choose a
target rate that resulted in full participation (xj = 1).
Each of the nonprofit advocacy organizations is risk neutral and seeks to maximize the
total expected value of the transfers that its segment receives from the implemented policy
minus the opportunity cost of the funds invested in nonpartisan gotv efforts,
πNPj(xj, x−j) = mjE (tj|xj, x−j)− xjc
(
mj, v
0
j
)
, (2)
where E(tj|xj, x−j) is the expected transfer that each citizen in segment j expects to receive
conditional on the ns-tuple of nonpartisan gotv efforts x.
12 Given the normalized budget of
one unit of the homogenous good, the total value of the transfers that segment j receives
from the implemented policy mjE(tj|xj, x−j) is equivalent to, and will henceforth be referred
to as, segment j’s expected share of the budget.
3 Results
Since it is individually rational for each voter to vote for the party that offers the higher
transfer (doing so increases the expected transfer from the implemented policy), we start our
analysis in the campaign stage and work our way back through the game tree. The second
stage equilibrium transfer schedules are provided in Theorem 1.
either or both imperfect targeting and uncertainty over the identity of non-voters), a slightly stronger form
of Propositions 2 and 3 hold as long as the constant marginal cost function c(mj) is elastic with respect to
the number of citizens in the segment. Note that under Assumption 2 the constant marginal cost is unit
elastic with respect to the segment size and, hence, forms an endpoint of the set of the elastic marginal cost
functions with respect to segment size.
12Note that the objective for each of the nonprofit advocacy organizations may also be interpreted as
maximizing the change in the expected transfers that its segment receives as a result of the investment in
nonpartisan gotv efforts minus the opportunity cost of that investment. That is,
πNPj (xj , x−j) = mj [E (tj |xj , x−j)− E (tj |0, 0)]− xjc
(
mj , v
0
j
)
.
Under this interpretation the objective function differs from equation (2) only by the constant −mjE(tj |0, 0).
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Campaign Stage
Theorem 1. Let v = (v1, . . . , vns) denote the turnout rates facing the two parties in a
subgame starting at the campaign stage of the game. A pair of transfer schedules (P ∗A, P
∗
B)
constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium pair of local strategies for the subgame starting at
v if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) Supp(P ∗i ) ⊂ T and (2) P ∗i
provides the corresponding unique set of univariate marginal distribution functions {F ∗i,j}nsj=1
where ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , ns}
F ∗i,j (t) =
t
2vj/
∑ns
h=1 vhmh
for t ∈
[
0,
2vj∑ns
h=1 vhmh
]
.
Moreover, such subgame perfect equilibrium local strategies exist and give an expected payoff
to each party of 1/2 of the vote share.
Proof. The existence of a pair of ns-variate distribution functions which satisfy conditions
(1) and (2) of Theorem 1 is provided in the appendix. The proof of the uniqueness of the
equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distribution functions is also given in the appendix.
In the following proof we show that any pair of ns-variate distribution functions which
satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 form an equilibrium. It is sufficient to show
that the expected vote share to each party from any budget-balanced strategy is less than
or equal to 1/2, given that the opposition party uses a joint distribution with the univariate
marginals outlined above and that expends the budget with probability one.
First note that if the ns-tuple of initial turnout rates {v0j}nsj=1 satisfies Assumption 1 [i.e.
that mj <
∑
j′ 6=j v
0
j′mj′ for all j], then it is clear that vjmj <
∑
j′ 6=j vj′mj′ for all j, and so,
no segment contains a majority of the voters.
Suppose that party A plays an arbitrary budget-balanced mixed strategy P̄A with the
set of univariate marginals {F̄A,j}nsj=1. Note that since P̄A is budget-balanced, it follows
that Supp(P̄A) ⊂ T . Also observe that if party B follows an equilibrium strategy P ∗B that
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satisfies condition (1) and has the unique set of univariate marginals {F ∗B,j}nsj=1 that satisfy
condition (2) outlined above, then Supp(P ∗B) is contained in the intersection of the ns-box∏ns
j=1[0, 2vj/(
∑ns
h=1 vhmh)] and T .
Party A’s expected payoff, πA(·) is calculated as
πA
(
P̄A, P
∗
B
)
=
1∑ns
j=1 vjmj
ns∑
j=1
vjmj
(∫ ∞
0
F ∗B,j(t)dF̄A,j(t)
)
(3)
In equation (3), the denominator of the first expression,
∑ns
j=1 vjmj, denotes the number
of citizens that vote in the election. While each party maximizes their expected vote
share, some of the citizens do not vote in the election, and this subset of citizens is not
included in the vote share calculations. In the second term in equation (3), the expression∑ns
j=1 vjmj(
∫∞
0
F ∗B,j(t)dF̄A,j(t)), denotes the expected number of voters to whom party A
provides a higher transfer.
Since party B’s transfers, drawn from an equilibrium strategy P ∗B, are contained in the
ns-box
∏ns
j=1[0, 2vj/(
∑ns
h=1 vhmh)], it is clear that in any optimal strategy party A never
provides transfers outside this ns-box. Inserting the unique set of equilibrium univariate
marginals for party B, {F ∗B,j}nsj=1, into equation (3) and simplifying yields,
πA
(
P̄A, P
∗
B
)
=
1∑ns
j=1 vjmj
ns∑
j=1
vjmj
(∫ 2vj∑ns
h=1
vhmh
0
t
2vj/
∑ns
h=1 vhmh
dF̄A,j(t)
)
(4)
In any optimal strategy the budget is spent with probability one, and it follows that it is
spent in expectation as well, i.e.
∑ns
j=1mj
∫∞
0
tdF̄A,j = 1. Thus, πA
(
P̄A, P
∗
B
)
≤ (1/2) since
Supp(P̄A) ⊂ T . If in addition Supp(P̄A) is contained in the set
∏ns
j=1[0, 2vj/(
∑ns
j=1 vjmj)],
then πA
(
P̄A, P
∗
B
)
= (1/2). This completes the proof that the expected vote share to each
party from any budget-balanced strategy is less than or equal to 1/2, given that the oppo-
sition party is using a joint distribution with the univariate marginals outlined above and
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that expends the budget with probability one.
The key feature of both parties’ equilibrium transfer schedules, and hence, the imple-
mented policy, is that each segment’s expected share of the budget, mjE(tj), is identical to
its share of the voters mjvj(x
∗
j)/
∑ns
h=1mhvh(x
∗
h). As stated in Proposition 1, this feature of
the equilibrium expected transfers implies that in each segment j, the expected share of the
budget is increasing in its turnout rate vj.
Proposition 1. In each segment j, the expected share of the budget mjE(tj) is equal to the
share of voters mjvj(x
∗
j)/
∑ns
h=1mhvh(x
∗
h) which is increasing in the turnout rate vj(x
∗
j).
In the characterization of the equilibrium transfer schedules given in Theorem 1, the
expected share of the budget that each party promises to segment j is equal to the share
of the voters, and thus, Proposition 1 follows directly from Theorem 1. It is important
to note that the result in Proposition 1 is endogenously determined by the nature of the
political competition in the campaign stage. That is, as long as each party is maximizing
their voteshare the expected share of the budget that each party promises to a segment is
equal to that segment’s share of the voters.
Note that since each segment’s share of the voters, and hence expected budget share,
is increasing in its turnout rate, each of the nonprofit advocacy organizations has incentive
to engage in nonpartisan gotv efforts. However, in each segment, the share of the voters is
also decreasing in the turnout rates of each of the other segments. In the next section we
characterize the optimal nonpartisan gotv efforts and examine the resulting changes in the
segments’ voter turnout rates and expected budget shares.
Although, for simplicity, our focus is on the case of deterministic voting, it is important
to note that our results are robust to probabilistic voting considerations, and it is, therefore,
not necessary to interpret our model as requiring that every voter within a given segment
votes for the same party. For example, assuming that in each segment j the proportion of
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the voters who vote for party A, when each party i ∈ {A,B} promises a transfer of ti,j, is
given by tmA,j/(t
m
A,j + t
m
B,j), our analysis corresponds to the deterministic case where m equals
infinity.13 If m < ∞, then voting is probabilistic. The interpretation of models with low m
is that they involve a sufficiently large amount of noise (see Konrad and Kovenock 2009 for a
discussion of how much noise is implied). Models with high m, with m =∞ the limiting case,
are models with low or no noise. Although there has not been a complete characterization
of the equilibrium set for the m ≥ 2 case, except for Baye, Kovenock and de Vries’ (1996)
characterization for m =∞, we do know that there exist equilibria in one-shot contests that
are payoff equivalent to the m =∞ case whenever m ≥ 2 (Baye, Kovenock, De Vries 1994,
Alcalde and Dahm 2010). Because, our main results depend on only the equilibrium payoffs,
our results are applicable for all cases of probabilistic voting in which m ≥ 2.
Nonpartisan gotv Stage
We now solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium local strategies in the nonpartisan
gotv stage. Recall that in each segment j, if the nonprofit advocacy organization chooses
a target rate of xj ∈ [0, 1] for the nonpartisan gotv efforts, then the updated turnout rate
in segment j, given in equation (1), is vj(xj) = v
0
j + (1 − v0j )xj, and the nonprofit incurs a
cost of xjc(mj, v
0
j ). The nonprofit seeks to maximize its expected payoff, given in equation
(2), by choosing a target rate for reducing voter abstention. Given the equilibrium expected
budget shares (see Proposition 1) the optimization problem for the nonprofit organization
in segment j may be written as
max
xj∈[0,1]
πNPj(xj, x−j) = max
xj∈[0,1]
mjvj(xj)∑ns
h=1mhvh(xh)
− xjc(mj, v0j ). (5)
13Note also that, Roberson (2006) shows that there exists a unique set of independent and simultaneous
all-pay auctions (i.e., single contests with m =∞) such that each equilibrium of the campaign stage subgame
forms an equilibrium in the corresponding set of all-pay auctions.
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Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium profile of
local strategies in the nonpartisan gotv stage. Note that in the nonpartisan gotv stage, the
optimization problem in equation (5) is isomorphic to the optimization problem faced by
each contestant in an ns-player Tullock game (Tullock 1980). The proof given here extends
the analysis of the multi-player Tullock game to allow for asymmetric head-start advantages
(i.e., the initial number of voters mjv
0
j in each segment j).
As we will show, some nonprofit organizations may choose not to engage in any nonpar-
tisan gotv efforts. Without loss of generality, number the segments in nondecreasing order
with respect to the expression mjv
0
j : m1v
0
1 ≤ m2v02 ≤ . . . ≤ mnsv0ns . Let P denote the set
of indices of the segments in which the nonprofits participate in gotv efforts (i.e., optimally
choose strictly positive targets x∗j > 0 for gotv efforts), and let k
∗ ≤ ns denote the number
of segments in which nonprofits choose to participate in gotv efforts. It will also be helpful
to define the expression Vk for k = 1, . . . , ns as follows,
Vk =
(
k − 1
)
+
[(
k − 1
)2
+ 4
(
αk
)(∑
j>kmjv
0
j
)]1/2
2
(
αk
) .
In the event that k = k∗, we will show that Vk∗ is equal to the equilibrium number of voters∑ns
j=1mjvj(x
∗
j).
Theorem 2. In the nonpartisan gotv stage of the game with ns-tuples of initial turnout
rates v0 = (v01, . . . , v
0
ns) and segment sizes m = (m
0
1, . . . ,m
0
ns) that satisfy Assumption 1,
there exists a unique pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium given by
x∗j =

1
mj(1−v0j )
[
Vk∗ − αV2k∗ −mjv0j
]
if j ≤ k∗
0 if j > k∗
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where k∗ is the largest index k such that
V(k−1) − αV2(k−1) > mkv0k.
The equilibrium number of voters is
ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j) = Vk∗ =
(
k∗ − 1
)
+
[(
k∗ − 1
)2
+ 4
(
αk∗
)(∑
j>k∗mjv
0
j
)]1/2
2
(
αk∗
) .
Proof. Given the relationship between the nonpartisan gotv stage and the multi-player Tul-
lock game, the following characterization of equilibrium strategies builds upon the charac-
terization of the multi-player Tullock game by Hillman and Riley (1989), Stein (2002), and
Matros (2006).
First note that it is clear that
mj
mj +
∑
j′ 6=j mj′vj′(xj′)
−
mjv
0
j
mjv0j +
∑
j′ 6=j mj′vj′(xj′)
<
mj
(
1− v0j
)∑ns
h=1mhv
0
h
(6)
for all j. Recall that each nonprofit can choose not to participate in nonpartisan gotv
efforts and have a strictly positive payoff. It follows from the nonprofit organization’s payoff
function, given in equation (5), that for any (ns − 1)-tuple of gotv efforts x−j ∈ [0, 1](ns−1)
the expected payoff in each segment j from choosing xj = 1 is strictly less than the payoff
from choosing xj = 0 if
mj
mj +
∑
j′ 6=j mj′vj′(xj′)
− c
(
mj, v
0
j
)
<
mjv
0
j
mjv0j +
∑
j′ 6=j mj′vj′(xj′)
From Assumption 2, c(mj, v
0
j ) = αmj(1 − v0j ) > (mj(1 − v0j )/
∑ns
h=1mhv
0
h). Combining this
with equation (6) it is clearly suboptimal for any nonprofit to set xj = 1, and, thus, the
relevant portion of the strategy space is x ∈ [0, 1)ns .
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At an interior solution the first-order condition for the nonprofit’s optimization problem
(see equation 5) is
mj
(
1− v0j
)(∑
j′ 6=j mj′vj′(xj′)
)
(∑ns
h=1mhvh(xh)
)2 − αmj(1− v0j) = 0 (7)
The second-order condition for this optimization problem is
−
2m2j
(
1− v0j
)2(∑
j′ 6=j mj′vj′(xj′)
)
(∑ns
h=1mhvh(xh)
)3 < 0, (8)
and, thus, the objective function is strictly concave.
Given the strict concavity of the objective function, it is clearly suboptimal for the
nonprofit in segment j to set x∗j = 0 if there exists an x
∗
j > 0 which solves segment j’s
first-order condition given in equation (7). For each of the k∗ participating nonprofits (i.e.,
j ∈ P), the first-order condition in equation (7) provides the following necessary condition
for equilibrium,
mjvj(x
∗
j) =
( ns∑
h=1
mhvh(x
∗
h)
)
− α
( ns∑
h=1
mhvh(x
∗
h)
)2
. (9)
Observe that the right-hand side of equation (9) is the same for all j ∈ P , and recall from
equation (1) that mjvj(xj) = mjv
0
j + mj(1 − v0j )xj. It, therefore, follows from equation (9)
that for each j ∈ P the increase in the number of voters mj(1− v0j )x∗j is strictly decreasing
with respect to mjv
0
j , and thus for j ∈ P , m1(1− v01)x∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ mk∗(1− v0k∗)x∗k∗ > 0, where
k∗ is the number of participating nonprofit organizations. The ns − k∗ non-participating
nonprofits (i.e., j /∈ P) are characterized by j > k∗, x∗j = 0, and mjvj(0) = mjv0j .
Summing across all segments
ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j) = k
∗
( ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j)
)
− αk∗
( ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j)
)2
+
(∑
j>k∗
mjv
0
j
)
, (10)
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Recalling the definition of the expression Vk, rearranging equation (10) provides the equilib-
rium number of voters
∑ns
j=1mjvj(x
∗
j),
ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j) = Vk∗ =
(
k∗ − 1
)
+
[(
k∗ − 1
)2
+ 4
(
αk∗
)(∑
j>k∗mjv
0
j
)]1/2
2
(
αk∗
) (11)
Recall from equation (1) that mjvj(xj) = mjv
0
j +mj(1− v0j )xj. It follows from equations
(9) and (11) that the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv efforts are given by:
x∗j =

1
mj(1−v0j )
[
Vk∗ − αV2k∗ −mjv0j
]
if j ≤ k∗
0 if j > k∗
(12)
To determine which nonprofit organizations choose to participate in nonpartisan gotv efforts
recall that the index k∗ is such that m1(1− v01)x∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ mk∗(1− v0k∗)x∗k∗ > 0, and x∗j = 0,
for j > k∗. From the first-order condition given in equation (7), the number of nonprofit
organizations that participate in nonpartisan gotv effort k∗ is the largest index k such that
V(k−1) − αV2(k−1) > mkv0k (13)
where V(k−1) is defined as follows
V(k−1) =
(
k − 2
)
+
[(
k − 2
)2
+ 4α
(
k − 1
)(∑
j>(k−1)mjv
0
j
)]1/2
2α
(
k − 1
) . (14)
This completes the proof of existence. The proof of uniqueness follows along the lines of
Matros (2006).
Before turning to the formal summary of the nature of the unique equilibrium of the
nonpartisan gotv stage (stated in Propositions 2 and 3 below), it is helpful to examine
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a simple example which illuminates the main features. Consider an electorate with 100
citizens divided among 4 segments. The cost of nonpartisan gotv efforts is assumed to be
xjc(mj, v
0
j ) = xj(0.013)mj(1− v0j ). For each segment, Table 1 below provides the number of
citizens, the initial voter turnout rate, the unique equilibrium nonpartisan gotv effort, the
expected share of the budget, and the initial share of the voters. The segments are arranged
in ascending order with respect to the number of citizens, with segment 1 having 20 citizens,
segments 2 and 3 having 25 citizens, and segment 3 having 30 citizens. The initial voter
turnout rate is 0.5 in segments 1 and 2 and 0.575 in segments 3 and 4. The number of citizens
and the initial voter turnout rates are given in columns 2 and 3, respectively, of Table 1.
Segment mj v
0
j x
∗
j vj(x
∗
j) mjE(tj|x∗j , x∗−j)
mjv
0
j∑ns
j=1 mjv
0
j
1 20 0.500 0.34 0.686 0.232 0.185
2 25 0.500 0.07 0.549 0.232 0.231
3 25 0.575 0 0.575 0.243 0.266
4 30 0.575 0 0.575 0.292 0.318
Table 1: Example
Not all of the segments engage in nonpartisan gotv efforts. From the fourth column
of Table 1 we see that in the unique equilibrium in the nonpartisan gotv stage only the
nonprofits in segments 1 and 2 participate in nonpartisan gotv efforts (i.e., x∗j > 0 for
j = 1, 2). As the condition in Theorem 2 states, nonpartisan gotv efforts only occur in those
segments in which the product of the size mj and the initial voter turnout rate v
0
j is below
a threshold. That is, equilibrium nonpartisan gotv efforts only occur in segments that are
sufficiently small and disenfranchised.
The fifth column provides the updated voter turnout rates that the political parties
use in the campaign stage. Note that the initial share of the voters (reported in the last
column of Table 1) provides us with what each segment’s expected share of the budget from
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the implemented policy would have been if there had not been a nonpartisan gotv stage.
Therefore, in comparing the last two columns of Table 1 we see how each segment’s expected
budget share changes as a result of the nonpartisan gotv stage. In this example, the change
in the voter turnout rate (see columns 3 and 5), as a result of the optimal nonpartisan gotv
efforts, is increasing in the segment’s level of disenfranchisement (i.e., the ex ante abstention
rate) and is decreasing in the segment’s size. As a result of these changes in the voter turnout
rates the political parties place relatively higher weights on the smaller more disenfranchised
segments. Comparing the last two columns of Table 1, we see that among the segments in
which nonpartisan gotv efforts arise (segments 1 and 2) the change in the expected budget
share is higher in the smaller segment (segment 1). As a result of the nonpartisan gotv stage,
the change in segment 1’s expected budget share is equal to .047 (.232 minus .185) while the
change in segment 2’s expected budget share is equal to .001 (.232 minus .231). Furthermore,
in each of the segments in which nonpartisian gotv efforts do not arise (segments 3 and 4),
the expected budget shares decrease.
As formally stated in Propositions 2 and 3, among those segments of the electorate that
engage in nonpartisan gotv efforts each segment’s increase in the voter turnout rate and the
resulting change in the expected budget share are both strictly decreasing with respect to
the number of citizens in the segment and the initial voter turnout rate in the segment.
Proposition 2. In each of the segments in which the nonprofit organizations participate in
nonpartisan gotv efforts (i.e., each j ∈ P or equivalently j ≤ k∗), the equilibrium increase in
segment j’s voter turnout rate, as a result of the nonpartisan gotv efforts, is strictly decreasing
with respect to both segment j’s number of citizens mj and the initial voter turnout rate v
0
j .
From the unique equilibrium target rates {x∗j}nsj=1 given in Theorem 2, it follows that for
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each segment j ∈ P the increase in segment j’s voter turnout rate is given by:
vj
(
x∗j
)
− v0j =
(
1− v0j
)
x∗j =
Vk∗
mj
− αV
2
k∗
mj
− v0j (15)
which is clearly decreasing with respect to both segment j’s number of citizens mj and the
initial voter turnout rate v0j . That is, the largest increases in the turnout rates occur in the
smallest and most disenfranchised segments.
Given the political parties’ optimal strategies in the campaign stage (see Theorem 1),
the equilibrium expected budget shares from the implemented policy are increasing with
respect to the voter turnout rates (Proposition 1). Thus, to the extent that nonpartisan
gotv efforts change the expected turnout rates, nonpartisan gotv efforts have an impact on
policy outcomes. As Proposition 2 states, among those segments in which nonpartisan gotv
efforts arise, the increase in the voter turnout rate is decreasing with respect to the number
of citizens and the initial voter turnout rate. Combining the results from Propositions 1 and
2, we see that among those segments in which nonpartisan gotv efforts arise the change in
the expected budget share is also decreasing with respect to the number of citizens and the
initial voter turnout rate.
Proposition 3. In each of the segments in which the nonprofit organizations participate in
nonpartisan gotv efforts (i.e., each j ∈ P or equivalently j ≤ k∗), the change in segment
j’s equilibrium expected share of the budget from the implemented policy, as a result of the
nonpartisan gotv efforts, is strictly decreasing with respect to both segment j’s number of
citizens mj and the initial voter turnout rate v
0
j .
In each of the segments in which the nonprofit organizations do not participate in non-
partisan gotv efforts (i.e., each j /∈ P or equivalently j > k∗), the equilibrium expected budget
share from the implemented policy decreases as a result of the nonpartisan gotv efforts in the
other segments.
21
Given the unique equilibrium expected budget shares, derived in Proposition 1, it follows
that for each segment j ∈ P the change in segment j’s expected budget share ∆mjE(tj|x∗)
as a result of the gotv activities of nonprofits is
∆mjE (tj|x∗) =
mjvj(x
∗
j)∑ns
h=1mhvh(x
∗
h)
−
mjv
0
j∑ns
h=1mhv
0
h
(16)
The first part of Proposition 3, then, follows from the equilibrium target rates given in
Theorem 2. In particular,
mjvj(x
∗
j)∑ns
h=1mhvh(x
∗
h)
= 1− αVk∗ , (17)
and, thus, from (16) the change in the expected budget share ∆mjE(tj|x∗) is decreasing
with respect to both segment j’s number of citizens mj and initial voter turnout rate v
0
j .
For the second part of Proposition 3, note that for each j /∈ P the change in segment j’s
expected budget share ∆mjE(tj|x∗) as a result of the gotv activities of nonprofits is
∆mjE (tj|x∗) =
mjv
0
j∑ns
h=1mhvh(x
∗
h)
−
mjv
0
j∑ns
h=1mhv
0
h
, (18)
which is strictly negative if any of the nonprofit organizations engage in nonpartisan gotv
efforts.
It is also important to note that just because the nonprofit affiliated with a segment
participates in gotv efforts, it is not necessarily the case that the segment’s change in the
expected budget share is positive. That is, it is possible that among the segments that
participate in gotv efforts one or more of the larger and more engaged segments may have a
lower expected budget share. However, it is still optimal for the nonprofits in such segments
to engage in nonpartisan gotv efforts since not doing so would result in even larger losses
from the nonpartisan gotv stage.
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4 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of nonpartisan gotv efforts in a simple multistage game of re-
distributive politics with voter abstention. For each segment of the electorate in equilibrium
the expected transfers from both of the political parties, and hence from the implemented
policy, are increasing with respect to the segment’s voter turnout rate. In weighing the costs
and benefits of nonpartisan gotv efforts, only the nonprofit advocacy groups affiliated with
sufficiently small and disenfranchised segments of the electorate engage in nonpartisan gotv
efforts. In those segments in which the corresponding nonprofit engages in gotv efforts, the
equilibrium increase in the voter turnout rate is decreasing in both the size of the segment
and in the initial turnout rate. As a result the smaller more disenfranchised segments gain
the most from nonpartisan gotv efforts. These results on the nature and impact of nonpar-
tisan gotv efforts illustrate that even though the political influence activities of nonprofit
advocacy organizations may be constrained, these activities influence policy outcomes and
are important tools for nonprofit advocacy organizations.
Appendix
This appendix establishes: (a) the existence of joint distributions which satisfy conditions (1)
and (2) of Theorem 1 (i.e., form an equilibrium in the campaign stage of the multistage game
of redistributive politics with targeted nonpartisan gotv efforts), and (b) the uniqueness of
the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distributions given in condition (2) of Theorem
1. The formal proof of the existence of strategies which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of
Theorem 1 follows lines drawn by Laslier (2002). In this appendix, we only show how the
subgame in the campaign stage is isomorphic to the game in that paper.
As mentioned in the description of the model, the subgame in the campaign stage extends
Laslier (2002) by allowing for voter abstention. In the case that in each segment the expected
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turnout rate (either initially or after the nonpartisan gotv stage) is 1, the two games are
equivalent.14 In the discussion that follows we show that the equilibria in these two games are
related even when the expected turnout rates are not all equal to 1. Recall that within each
segment, each party must promise the same transfer to each citizen. Thus, if the equilibrium
citizen-level randomization for segment j, given in Theorem 1, is
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , ns} F ∗i,j (t) = t2vj/∑nsh=1 vhmh for t ∈
[
0,
2vj∑ns
h=1 vhmh
]
,
then since there are mj citizens in segment j the segment-level randomization is given by
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , ns} F s∗i,j (t) = t2vjmj/∑nsh=1 vhmh for t ∈
[
0,
2vjmj∑ns
h=1 vhmh
]
, (19)
Letting m̂j ≡ mjvj(xj), the set of segment-level univariate marginal distributions functions
given in equation (19) is identical to that arising in Laslier (2002) and the joint distribution
construction given in Lemmas 4-7 of that paper applies directly. Therefore, each party has a
strategy that satisfies the restriction on the support given in condition (1) of Theorem 1 —
which implies directly that budget-balancing occurs with probability one — and that provides
the set of univariate marginal distribution functions stated in condition (2) of Theorem 1.
We now address the the uniqueness of the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distri-
butions given in condition (2) of Theorem 1. The formal proof of this uniqueness follows
lines drawn by Roberson (2006). The uniqueness of the equilibrium univariate marginal
distributions in the campaign stage follow from the relationship between the subgame in
the campaign stage and Roberson (2006). In the discussion that follows we will focus on
the segment-level univariate marginal distributions functions given in equation (19). Recall
that m̂j ≡ mjvj(xj). Roberson (2006) examines both the symmetric and asymmetric Colonel
Blotto game with homogeneous battlefields and provides a characterization of the equilibrium
14Note that in that paper the budget is set to Q, while in this paper the budget has been normalized to 1.
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sets of univariate marginal distributions for a range of parameter configurations. By focusing
on the segment-level univariate marginal distribution functions and setting m̂j ≡ mjvj(xj),
the subgame in the campaign stage is equivalent to a symmetric Colonel Blotto game with
heterogenous battlefields (i.e., segments of the electorate). In the case of symmetric resources,
the proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distributions given
in Roberson (2006) extends directly to allow for heterogenous battlefields.
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